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Abstract
Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing
moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to
explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of
moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is will-
ing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly)
committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commit-
ment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and
moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give
up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature
on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with,
non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I
argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be
grounded in exceptionless moral principles.
I. Introduction
As far as theories of scientific explanation are concerned, we can aptly de-
scribe the story of the 20th century as “The rise and fall of the D-N (De-
ductive Nomological) model of explanation.” The debate over the nature of
scientific explanation has occupied center stage in the philosophy of science
throughout the second half of the 20th century, and much of this debate has
been shaped by Hempel’s pioneering work on the topic, starting with his
(1942) ‘The Function of General Law in History’, Hempel and Oppenheim’s
(1948) ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, and Hempel’s seminal (1965)
‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’.
The early critiques of Hempel’s model in the 50’s byWilliamDray, Michael
Scriven, and others, targeted Hempel’s attempts to apply his deductive model
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of explanation to historical explanation. But from the early 60’s and on,
philosophers of science have started questioning the adequacy of the de-
ductive model even as an account of explanation in the physical sciences. I
believe that it is safe to say that few, if any, philosophers of science today
endorse the deductive model of explanation as it was presented by Hempel
back in the 40’s as an adequate account of scientific explanation.
There are, of course, many important differences between science and
moral philosophy. Nevertheless, there is at least one thing they have in com-
mon. Moral philosophy, like science, is in the business of explaining certain
features of the world. Moral philosophers, I take it, construct moral theories
in order to explain moral phenomena, in much the same way that scientist
construct scientific theories in order to explain natural phenomena. And
since moral theories are supposed to explain moral phenomena, questions
about the nature of explanation are as fundamental to moral theorizing as
they are to scientific theorizing.
Given the centrality of questions about the nature of explanation to moral
theorizing, it is surprising how little has been written on the nature of moral
explanation. Even more surprising, perhaps, is how little attention moral
philosophers have paid to the progress in the literature on scientific expla-
nation in the philosophy of science. I believe that many moral philosophers
endorse (either implicitly or explicitly) a deductive model of explanation, and
that this commitment to a deductive model of explanation prevents many
of these philosophers from considering seriously a novel approach to moral
theorizing that I find quite promising—namely, particularism.
Over the past few hundred years moral philosophers have tried to find
and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that identify features
that all and only morally right actions have in common. Utilitarianism and
Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. The thought was
that in order to explain the rightness of any particular action we must iden-
tify a feature that this action exemplifies that guarantees its rightness. For
example, Utilitarians believe that any action that exemplifies the property
of utility maximization is morally right. In order to explain the rightness of
a particular action, A, we have to show that A exemplifies the property of
utility maximization. And since any action that exemplifies this property is
morally right, then so is A. Nevertheless despite the continuing efforts of
many of the most able philosophers in the past few centuries, exceptionless
moral principles have not yet been found.1
This persistent failure invites us to examine the presumption that such
principles are essential to moral theorizing—a presumption that is widely
endorsed but rarely, if ever, argued for. And this presumption, I believe,
lies at the heart of one of the most interesting and controversial debates in
contemporary moral philosophy—the particularism-generalism debate. As I
see it, the debate between particularists and generalists is best understood
as a debate over which research program we ought to pursue.2 Generalists, I
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propose, are committed to a research program according to which we must
find and formulate exceptionless moral principles in order to provide an ad-
equate explanation of moral phenomena (and especially the rightness and
wrongness of actions), whereas particularists are committed to an alternative
research program according to which we can explain morality without ap-
pealing to exceptionless moral principles. So one key question concerning the
particularism-generalism debate, as I understand it, is whether an adequate
explanation of morality is possible without an appeal to exceptionless moral
principles. If the answer to this question is “No,” then we have good reason
to abandon the particularist research program. However, if the answer is
“Yes,” then given that exceptionless (explanatory) moral principles have not
yet been found, we will have ample motivation to pursue the particularist
research program.
The main question of this paper, then, concerns the nature of explana-
tion in ethics. Must (adequate) moral explanations make use of exceptionless
moral principles? In the past few years several ethicists began to explore the
possibility of non-deductive models of moral explanation—models of expla-
nation that do not make use of exceptionless moral principles.3 In this paper
I hope to contribute to these efforts by looking more closely at the develop-
ments in the philosophy of science on the nature of (scientific) explanation. I
argue that there are interesting lessons to be learned about moral theorizing
by reviewing the literature on scientific explanation. I proceed as follows. In
§II, I examine the most influential presentation of the deductive model of
explanation—namely, Hempel and Oppenheim’s account—and I show that
the claim that explanations must be deductive is asserted but never argued
for. In §III, I argue that we have good reasons to believe that not all expla-
nations are deductive. In §IV, I discuss non-deductive models of explanation
based on ceteris paribus laws, and in §V, I present a few non-deductive mod-
els of explanations that do not require laws at all. In §VI, I consider the
pragmatic aspects of explanation. Finally, in §VII, I show that giving up on
a deductive model of explanation not only undermines principle monism,
but it gives us good reason to abandon pluralism as well.
II. Explanation and Exceptionless Generalizations
Since moral theories are in the business of explaining moral phenomena,
one’s views about moral explanation will influence the kind of moral the-
ories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers in the past
few centuries believed that adequate moral explanations must appeal to
exceptionless moral principles—as evidenced by their persistent attempts
to find and formulate such principles—yet few, if any, argued for this
presumption.
The fact that this presumption was accepted without argument does not
entail that this presumption was unmotivated. It is plausible, I think, that
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the remarkable progress in the sciences spawned by the scientific revolution
motivated moral philosophers to search for exceptionless moral principles.
The discovery and formulation of scientific laws, and most notably Newton’s
laws, led to astounding achievements in the sciences. So it may have been
natural to expect that if we could find and formulate the “laws of moral-
ity,” we could, perhaps, accomplish similar advances in ethics. Surely moral
phenomena are complex and diverse and it may not appear as though the
moral landscape could be captured by a set of simple principles. But then
again, prior to the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687, the thought
that three simple and elegant principles could explain celestial phenomena as
well as the behavior of massive objects on Earth was unfathomable. So even
those who respect Aristotle’s dictum, that “a well-schooled man is one who
searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature
of the subject at hand admits” (Nicomachean Ethics I.3:1094b24) may insist
that although ethics, like science, does not appear to be the kind of study
that admits of a great deal of precision, it may perhaps, like science, permit
of more precision than it seems to allow at first sight—if only we manage to
find the correct moral principles.
All this is to say that there were, in fact, good reasons to pursue the
generalist research program even though the underlying commitment of
this program concerning the essentiality of exceptionless generalizations
to adequate moral explanation was never explicitly argued for. Neverthe-
less, if after a sufficiently long period of time a research program fails to
provide the results one had hoped it would deliver, one may well ques-
tion its fundamental commitments. And since we have not yet managed
to find and formulate satisfactory exceptionless explanatory moral prin-
ciples, the generalist research program has, so far, failed to provide an
adequate account of morality. So we should now ask whether there are
any arguments in support of the generalist presumption, and whether
there are any good reasons to object to the particularist commitment
that (adequate) moral explanation need not appeal to exceptionless moral
principles.
A natural place to look for such arguments is the literature on the nature
of explanation. And indeed, the most influential essay in modern discussion
of this topic—namely, Hempel and Oppenheim’ “Studies in the Logic of
Explanation”—provides a detailed model of explanation according to which
exceptionless generalizations are essential for adequate explanations.4 The
fundamental insight of Hempel and Oppenheim’s model, which is known in
the literature as the “covering law model,” or the “D-N model,” is that to
explain a certain phenomenon is to demonstrate that this phenomenon had to
occur. An explanation, on this model, has the form of a deductive argument.
The conclusion of the argument is (a sentence describing) the phenomenon
to be explained—the explanandum—and the premises of the argument—(the
sentences describing) the explanans—must logically imply the explanandum.
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Moreover, the explanans must include a statement of a general law, and this
law must play an indispensable role in the derivation of the explanandum.
Hempel and Oppenheim were interested primarily in the structure of
scientific explanation. Nevertheless, it seems as though moral philosophers
have also endorsed the idea that explanation is subsumptive in nature. John
Ladd—one of the few philosophers who explicitly discusses the nature of
moral explanation—claims that “the aim of explanation . . . is an ordering of
phenomena under general law . . .To the question “Why?,” explanations an-
swer by a subsumption under a general statement.” (1952:499) In a footnote,
Ladd directs the reader to Hempel and Oppenheim’s essay for a more pre-
cise account of explanation.5 Since subsumption under general statement is,
according to Ladd, the very essence of explanation, he concludes that there
are no important differences between the basic pattern of explanation that
Hempel and Oppenheim identify in the empirical sciences and the basic pat-
tern of explanation in ethics. “Ethical theory,” he writes, “seeks to explain,
and therefore uses the methods of explanation which are similar to those
of the other empirical sciences such as psychology, physics, meteorology,
linguistics, etc.” (501)
Now if Ladd and Hempel and Oppenheim are right about the structure of
explanation in ethics, then the particularist project is in trouble, because if in
order to explain a certain phenomenon we must subsume this phenomenon
under a general law, then in order to explain the rightness of action R, we will
have to find a general law (or principle) that “covers” R. That is, if Hempel
and Oppenheim are right, then an explanation of the rightness of R should
have the following form:
1) Action R has feature ϕ.
2) Every action that has feature ϕ is morally right.
}
Explanans
3) (Therefore,) action R is morally right. } Explanandum
Without the (exceptionless) principle stated in line (2), the explanans
would not logically imply the explanandum, and consequently, the expla-
nation would be inadequate. So if an explanation that fails to conform to
this model is defective, the particularist research program is doomed from
the outset.
But why should we think that all explanations must conform to the de-
ductive model of explanation? Ladd, alluding to Hempel and Oppenheim
again, claims that explanations “should provide us with statements that have
‘potential predictive force.’”6 And the general laws cited in the explanans af-
ford explanations with predictive power. But Ladd does not explain why we
should think that explanations must have predictive force in the first place.
Indeed, for Hempel and Oppenheim the fact that “the difference between
[explanation and prediction] is of pragmatic character” and that “an expla-
nation is not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in time,
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could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under considera-
tion” (138) are not constraints on a theory of explanation, but consequences
of the theory of explanation they propose.
So why do Hempel and Oppenheim think that explanations are subsump-
tive in nature? Interestingly, this question is not explicitly answered in their
essay. Hempel and Oppenheim tell us that their goal is “to shed some light
on [the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation] by
means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation.”
(135) They begin their survey with two illustrations of scientific explanations.
The first is an explanation of the initial drop, and subsequent swift rise of
the mercury level in a glass thermometer, when the thermometer is rapidly
immersed in hot water. “How is this phenomenon to be explained?” they
ask. (135) Now this question is ambiguous. It could be understood as a
question about how the abovementioned phenomenon is actually explained
by scientists. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as a question about how
this phenomenon ought to be explained. And Hempel and Oppenheim seem
to shift from the descriptive reading to the normative one.
One might think that this shift from a descriptive reading to a normative
reading is innocuous. Naturally, if we are to give an analysis of the concept
of scientific explanation, it is a good idea to begin our inquiry with a few
paradigmatic samples of scientific explanation—samples that exemplify, as
clearly as possible, the components of the proposed analysis. Indeed, one
might have though that Hempel and Oppenheim provide paradigmatic ex-
emplars of scientific explanation in order to help their readers identify the
concept they are trying to give an account of. But surprisingly, the illus-
trations Hempel and Oppenheim provide do not exemplify the pattern of
explanation they propose. In order to see this, it is worth citing their sample
explanation, and their analysis of this example, at length. “The increase in
temperature,” they write,
affects at first only the glass tube of the thermometer; it expands and thus
provides a larger space for the mercury inside, whose surface therefore drops. As
soon as by heat conduction the rise in temperature reaches the mercury, however,
the latter expands, and as its coefficient of expansion is considerably larger
than that of glass, a rise of the mercury level results.—This account consists of
statements of two kinds. Those of the first kind indicate certain conditions which
are realized prior to, or at the same time as, the phenomenon to be explained;
we shall refer to them briefly as antecedent conditions. In our illustration,
the antecedent conditions include, among others, the fact that the thermometer
consists of a glass tube which is partly filled with mercury, and that it is immersed
into hot water. The statements of the second kind express certain general laws; in
our case, these include the laws of the thermic expansion of mercury and of glass,
and a statement about the small thermic conductivity of glass. The two sets of
statements, if adequately and completely formulated, explain the phenomenon
under consideration: They entail the consequence that the mercury will first
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drop, then rise. Thus, the event under discussion is explained by subsuming it
under general laws, i.e., by showing that it occurred in accordance with those
laws, by virtue of the realization of certain specified antecedent conditions.
(135–6)
Hempel and Oppenheim begin by presenting a possible explanation of
the phenomenon in question. Their proposed explanation may well be the
answer one would receive from a scientist to the question “How is this
phenomenon to be explained?”—First the glass tube expands, causing the
mercury level to drop; then, when the mercury heats up, the mercury expands
and the level of mercury in the tube rises. Next, Hempel and Oppenheim go
on to analyze this proposed explanation. They claim that this explanation
involves two kinds of statements: antecedent conditions and general laws.
The antecedent conditions include “the fact that the thermometer consists
of a glass tube which is partly filled with mercury, and that it is immersed
into hot water.” And these features are indeed mentioned in our sample
explanation. However, the statements of general laws they identify—“the laws
of the thermic expansion of mercury and of glass”—are not mentioned in the
sample explanation at all.7 In claiming that explanations involve statements
of general laws, Hempel and Oppenheim are no longer describing the sample
scientific explanation they have given us; instead they are offering a normative
account of what scientific explanation ought to look like.
The last two sentences of the cited passage are particularly telling. “The
two sets of statements [i.e., antecedent conditions and general laws], if ade-
quately and completely formulated, explain the phenomenon under considera-
tion.” The qualification “if adequately and completely formulated” indicates
that the sample “explanation” described in the beginning of the paragraph is,
in fact, an inadequate explanation; only when the antecedent conditions and
general laws are adequately and completely formulated, we will have properly
explained the phenomenon in question. “Thus, the event under discussion,”
they claim, “is explained by subsuming it under general laws.” But the “thus”
here is misleading. Hempel and Oppenheim proposed a reconstruction of the
sample explanation they originally presented as a subsumptive explanation,
but they offered no argument to support their claim that “the event under
discussion is explained by subsuming it under general law.” In fact, if we take
the sample explanation at face value, the event under discussion is explained
without mention of any general law at all.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with, or unusual about, offering a
reconstruction of a sample explanation; it is not uncommon for philosophers
of science to try to unmask the underlying structure of scientific concepts
like ‘scientific explanation’ even if this structure is rarely, if ever, explicitly
exemplified in scientific discourse. But if this is what Hempel and Oppenheim
are doing, then the sample explanation they discuss provides no support for
their analysis, nor does it help us to identify the concept they are trying
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to analyze. They could have begun their paper by stating their proposed
analysis and showing that they can reconstruct sample explanation to fit the
explanation schema they put forward.8
To be clear, I have not argued that the covering law model is false or even
problematic. All I have claimed so far is that we have not yet been given
any reason to think that explanations must have a deductive form; despite
Hempel and Oppenheim’s rhetoric (e.g., “From the preceding sample cases
let us now abstract some general characteristics of scientific explanation.”
(136)) their appeal to sample explanations offers no support for the pattern
of explanation they propose, and as far as I can tell, they offer no other
argument to motivate their deductive model of explanation.
Now if there were no difficulties for Hempel and Oppenheim’s model,
and if there were no alternative theories of explanation, we might have had
reason to accept this model of explanation—even though Hempel and Op-
penheim offer no argument to convince us that this is the correct model of
explanation—in virtue of its success, or in virtue of the absence of compet-
ing accounts. In the next section I will argue that the deductive model of
explanation faces serious problems. In the subsequent sections I will present
several alternative models of explanation.
III. Are All Explanations Deductive?
One noticeable difficulty for applying the covering law model of explanation
in ethics is that we have not yet managed to find and formulate exceptionless
moral principles that can be used in deductive explanations. Lying, for in-
stance, is typically wrong (or wrong-making), but not always.9 So we cannot
deduce that an act is wrong from the fact that it involves lying. Usually, an
act is right if it brings about the best consequences, but not always.10 So
we cannot deduce that an act is right from the fact that it leads to the best
consequences.
The absence of exceptionless generalizations that can be used in deductive
explanations is not unique to ethics. In the special sciences—e.g., in biology,
psychology, economics, and history—scientists have yet to find and formulate
exceptionless laws. And since exceptionless laws are not currently available in
these disciplines, it follows that if scientists provide any adequate explanations
in these fields at all, their explanations conform to an alternative, non-
deductive, model of explanation.
Interestingly, Hempel and Oppenheim were well aware of this point, and
indeed they claimed that (most) explanations in the special sciences are, in
fact, incomplete. To illustrate the incompleteness of explanations in the spe-
cial sciences, they presented one popular explanation of the severe price drop
at the US cotton exchanges in the fall of 1946. The price drop, according to
this explanation, was due to the fact that a large-scale speculator began to
liquidate his stocks, which was soon followed by many panicked liquidations
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by smaller speculators. According to Hempel and Oppenheim, even though
general regularities are not explicitly mentioned in this explanation, some
general regularities are “referred to” or “implied” by it. For instance, this ex-
planation, they claim, implies “some form of the law of supply and demand,”
and it relies on “regularities in the behavior of individuals who are trying to
preserve or improve their economic position.” (141) These laws, they admit,
“cannot be formulated at present with satisfactory precision and general-
ity.” And consequently, “the suggested explanation is surely incomplete, but
its intention is unmistakably to account for the phenomenon by integrating
it into a general pattern of economic and socio-psychological regularities.”
(141)
There are several difficulties with this analysis. First, the fact (if it is a
fact) that the proposed explanation “refers to,” “implies,” or “relies on,”
several generalities, does not mean that these regularities are a part of the
explanation. For example, factual claims “rely on” evidence. But the evidence
for the truth of the explanans need not be part of the explanation, even
though the explanation “relies on” these facts. Also, the explanans may
imply all kinds of statements that are not relevant to the explanation in
hand. For example, any explanans trivially implies all tautologies, but these
tautologies are not part of the explanation. Moreover, a generalization of
the form (1) All Fs are Gs implies that (2) if a is F then a is G, but claim
(2) may be irrelevant to an explanation if the explanandum is that (3) b is G.
So although (2) is implied by (1) it is not a part of the explanation of (3).
Similarly, even if the explanation in question “implies” the law of supply and
demand, and “relies on” some psychological regularities, it is not clear that
these regularities ought to be included as a part of the explanation.11
Second, since the relevant laws and regularities “cannot be formulated at
present with satisfactory precision and generality,” this explanation fails to
satisfy the conditions of adequacy that Hempel and Oppenheim identify—
the explanans does not imply the explanandum. So why is this proposed
explanation an “incomplete explanation” rather than simply a failed expla-
nation? Indeed, how is it an “explanation” at all? Perhaps the thought is
that this “incomplete explanation” is an explanation because it approximates
the “real explanation” of the phenomenon in question. In an earlier paper
Hempel introduced the notion of explanation sketches; an explanation sketch
is not a full-fledged explanation, but presumably it could be turned into
one:
What the explanatory analyses of historical events offer is . . . in most cases not
an explanation in one of the meanings developed above, but something that
might be called an explanation sketch. Such a sketch consists of a more or
less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant,
and it needs “filling out” in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation. This
filling-out requires further empirical research, for which the sketch suggests
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the direction. (Explanation sketches are common also outside of history; many
explanations in psychoanalysis, for instance, illustrate this point.) (1942:42)
Hempel and Oppenheim assume that although explanations in the special
sciences are incomplete, they give us some indication as to how they are
to be “filled out,” or supplemented so as to form complete explanations.12
In the aforementioned example, for instance, the proposed explanation indi-
cates that we need to find an exceptionless formulation of the law of supply
and demand, and one or more exceptionless regularities regarding human
psychology and motivation in order to obtain a full-fledged explanation.
But a few problems remain. First it is still unclear how explanation
sketches explain anything. Since we cannot deduce the explanandum from
the explanans in an explanation sketch, then either explanation sketches do
not explain, or deduction is not required for explanation. Even if explanation
sketches indicate to us what we need to do in order to find a full-fledged
explanation, they cannot explain at all if Hempel and Oppenheim are right
about the deductive nature of genuine explanation.
A related problem is that at present it is an open question whether there
are any strict laws, or exceptionless (explanatory) generalizations, in the spe-
cial sciences. For example, it is an open question whether we can find and
formulate a non-trivial exceptionless version of the law of supply and de-
mand, not to mention (strict) psychological laws, or (strict) historical laws.
If it turns out that there are no (strict) laws in the special sciences, then it
follows, on Hempel and Oppenheim’s account, that these sciences provide
no explanations at all—not even explanation sketches.
Finally, it is not clear that explanation sketches always, or even often,
suggest a direction for “filling out” explanation sketchs in order to fit the
Hempel-Oppenheim schema. Consider, for instance, the following explana-
tion for why Germany declared war on Russia in August 1914.
Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated
in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb on June 28, 1914. As a result, Emperor Franz
Joseph of Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Russia, as an ally of Serbia,
declared war on Austria, which was followed by a German declaration of war
on Russia on August 1, 1914.
Obviously there is a lot more one could say here as part of the expla-
nation of the German declaration of war on Russia. One could elaborate
on the socio-political situation in Europe, including the various agreements
and power struggles between nations, and in this respect we could think of
our proposed explanation as an “explanation sketch.” However, it certainly
doesn’t look like the intention of this explanation is to subsume the event in
question under an exceptionless law. It is not clear that this sketch “implies,”
“refers to,” or “relies on” any exceptionless regularity, and this “sketch”
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doesn’t seem to suggest any particular way for filling it out in such a way
that it would fit the Hempel-Oppenheim explanation schema.
As we have seen, for Hempel and Oppenheim explanation sketches are
defective explanations—an explanation sketch is merely a placeholder for the
“real” explanation that we ought to look for, and it is only explanatory to the
extent that it indicates to us how to obtain the “real” explanation. Hempel’s
line of thought, then, is roughly this: we have made a philosophical discovery
regarding the form of proper explanation; explanations in the special sciences
do not exemplify this form, and therefore, they are defective.
Other philosophers take a different approach.13 Many explanations in the
special sciences, they claim, are perfectly adequate. But Hempel and Oppen-
heim’s theory of explanation tells us that these explanations are defective.
Therefore, Hempel and Oppenheim’s account is false. Indeed, since most, if
not all, of the explanations given in the special science (as well as many of
the explanations given in the physical sciences—including Hempel and Op-
penheim’s examples) do not exemplify the model of explanation that Hempel
and Oppenheim develop, we may doubt whether Hempel and Oppenheim
have given us an account of the most important or interesting sense of
‘explanation’.
Interestingly, later on Hempel recognized that a deductive model of expla-
nation is not the only model of explanation employed in the sciences. In his
(1965) ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’ Hempel developed his inductive-
statistical model of explanation (IS model) in order to account for expla-
nations based on statistical laws. The explanandum of an IS-explanation
cannot be deduced from its explanans; all that can be deduced is that the
explanandum is more or less likely to occur. For example, if some law entails
that a certain coin is 90% likely to land heads if tossed, we cannot use this
law to deduce that this coin would land heads when tossed. Nevertheless, we
can explain the event of this coin landing heads by citing the fact that the
coin was tossed, and that given the relevant law it was 90% likely to land
heads. For Hempel, an IS-explanation is successful to the extent that the
explanans confers high probability on the explanandum.
For our purposes here, we need not discuss the difficulties for Hempel’s
IS-model, and the various refinements of statistical explanations offered in
the literature.14 The important point is that Hempel, like many other philoso-
phers, recognized that not all explanations are deductive. And it is hard to
see what reasons one could have for thinking that statistical explanation is
the only admissible form of non-deductive explanation.
In this section I argued that there are various difficulties for Hempel’s
deductive model of explanation. Even if Hempel’s account captures the logic
of explanation in the physical sciences—which is far from obvious15—it
seems quite clear that it fails to capture the structure of explanation in the
special sciences. Moreover, since we have not been given any argument for
the claim that explanations are essentially deductive, and given Hempel’s own
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admission that some explanations are not deductive, we have good reason to
explore alternative non-deductive models of explanation.
IV. Ceteris Paribus Explanation
According to the D-N model, strict laws are essential for adequate explana-
tions, since without strict laws we cannot deduce the explanandum from the
explanans. There are several competing views on the nature of laws, but one
thing they all agree on is that a strict law is (at least) a universally quantified
conditional statement that whenever certain conditions obtain, other condi-
tions obtain as well. Schematically, we can represent strict laws as follows:
‘all Fs are Gs’. If we find one instance of (F & ∼G), then ‘all Fs are Gs’ is
false—i.e., ‘all Fs are Gs’ is not a strict law.16
Several philosophers, however noted that strict laws are hard to come by—
particularly in the special sciences. Pietroski and Rey, for example, write: “it
seems that special sciences do not—and, indeed, probably could not—state
genuinely exceptionless generalizations.” (1995:83) Our current best “laws”
in the special sciences are not immune to counterexamples unless we qualify
these laws with ‘ceteris paribus’ (i.e., ‘all thing being equal’) clauses. As Lip-
ton observes “Most laws are ceteris paribus laws. If we are being punctilious,
what we say is not ‘All Fs are G’, but only ‘All Fs are G, all else being equal’.”
(1999:155) Similarly, Silverberg claims that “If there are any psychological
laws, they would be ceteris paribus laws. Between the occurrence of any sort
of psychological going-on and any subsequent sort of event, intervening dis-
ruptive factors can intrude. Between time t1 and later time t2 a psychological
system might go mad, or die, or the universe might disappear.” (201) And
likewise, Morreau maintains that
Hedged laws are the only ones we can hope to find. Laws are commonly sup-
posed to be truths, but interesting generalizations, without some modifier such
as ‘ceteris paribus’, are by and large false. This is so in ethics, in history, and
in non-basic sciences: economics, biology, psychology, and the rest. There are
reasons to think it so in basic sciences like physics, too. (1999:163)
Setting aside the dispute about the availability of strict laws in the physical
science,17 it is clear that we have not yet found strict laws in many of the spe-
cial sciences, and that at present we have to settle for hedged generalizations
or ceteris paribus generalizations in those fields. Moreover, some philoso-
phers have even argued that the special sciences are incapable of establishing
strict laws.18
Following Pietroski and Rey and others, I will take as data for any the-
ory of explanation that special sciences like biology, psychology, economics,
and history, sometimes provide good explanations even when strict laws are
unavailable.19 This means that explanation can proceed without strict laws.
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Nevertheless, one might insist, with Hempel and Oppenheim, that explana-
tion requires subsumption under law. Schiffer (1991) succinctly summarizes
this line of thought as follows:
Some philosophers believe that there are ceteris paribus laws and that with-
out them there would be no special-science explanations, and hence no special
sciences. These philosophers think that science is in the business of providing
scientific explanations, that such explanations require laws, and that there are
no, or only very few, strict special-science laws; whence their appeal to ceteris
paribus laws. (1)
If the business of science is to construct explanations grounded in laws,
then the special sciences must find and formulate laws not only in order to
provide explanation, but also in order to vindicate their status as genuine
sciences. But since we are currently unable to find strict laws in the special
sciences, then perhaps we can make do with ceteris paribus laws instead.
Unlike strict laws, ceteris paribus generalizations are defeasible, and they can
survive exceptions; the statement ‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’ is not refuted
by one instance of (F&∼G).
Two questions arise: (1) Can ceteris paribus generalizations qualify as
genuine laws? That is, can genuine laws have exceptions?20 And (2) Even if
there are genuine ceteris paribus laws, can these laws explain anything? Let
us address these questions in turn.
The two main worries concerning the existence of genuine ceteris paribus
laws are these: (1) We do not have an informative account of the truth
conditions for ceteris paribus law statements, and consequently, some have
argued that a ceteris paribus law—e.g., ‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’—asserts
nothing more than the vacuous tautology ‘All Fs are Gs, except when they are
not.’21 (2) Ceteris paribus laws make no predictions. The law ‘ceteris paribus,
all Fs are Gs’, combined with the information that x is F (and together with
any combination of auxiliary hypotheses), does not entail that x is G (or even
that with probably p, x is G).
Several philosophers proposed sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of
ceteris paribus laws. For example, Pietroski and Rey suggest that ‘ceteris
paribus, all Fs are Gs’ is non-vacuous if (roughly) whenever x is F , but x
is not G, there is an independently explanatory interfering factor at work;
that is, there is a factor H that explains why x is not G, and H also explains
something other than the fact that x is not G.22
This proposal is not without difficulties. Several philosophers have ar-
gued that it is too permissive—that is, too many statements qualify as ceteris
paribus laws on this account.23 Yet even if it is too permissive, it neverthe-
less shows that ceteris paribus statements are not vacuous—not any general
statement qualifies as a ceteris paribus law.24 Moreover, even if this proposal
cannot be refined and improved on, the problem of the absence of truth
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conditions for ceteris paribus law-statements might not be devastating. As
Earman, Roberts, and Smith explain:
Perhaps it is unreasonable to demand truth conditions for CP law-statements.
This could be because the concept of a CP law is a primitive concept, which is
meaningful even though it cannot be defined in more basic terms. Or it could be
because an assertability semantics or conceptual-role semantics, rather than a
truthconditional semantics, is appropriate for CP law-statements. Furthermore,
one might well deny that it is necessary to have an acceptable philosophical
account of the semantics for a given type of statement before granting that that
type of statement plays an important role in science. And it is hard to deny
that there are examples of statements qualified by CP clauses that seem to be
perfectly meaningful.25 (293)
The second worry—that ceteris paribus laws make no predictions—is,
according to Earman, Roberts, and Smith, conclusive. Since ceteris paribus
laws make no predictions, they are untestable; and since they are untestable,
they cannot partake in scientific theorizing.
However, one could deny that ceteris paribus laws make no predictions.
For instance, the law ‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’ predicts that if x is F ,
and cetera are paria, then x is G. The problem is that we cannot specify the
conditions under which cetera are paria, or in other words, that we cannot
provide informative truth conditions for the statement ‘cetera are paria’.26
But this problem doesn’t seem any different from the first—that we cannot
provide truth conditions for ceteris paribus statements. So if the first problem
is surmountable—that is, if we are willing to accept the idea that ceteris
paribus statements are meaningful even though we do not have an acceptable
philosophical account of the semantics for these types of statements—then
so is the second.
Furthermore, why should we think that predictions ought to be deductive?
Certainly we cannot deductively predict that a particular F is G from the law
‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’; that is, we cannot predict this with certainty.
But we make non-deductive predictions all the time: we predict the weather;
we predict the outcome of elections and sporting events; we make predictions
about the stock market and the economy, and so forth. In all these cases
our predictions are not deductive, and the claim that our predictions might
be false doesn’t undermine their status as genuine predictions, nor does it
prevent us from evaluating them as a good/bad or better/worse predictions.
Our grounds for making such predictions, as well as our justification for
these predictions may well rest on various ceteris paribus generalizations. This
observation indicates that the claim that all predictions must be deductive—
that is, that predictions must rely on strict laws, and must guarantee the
occurrence of the event predicted—is not a constraint issued by the nature
of the concept of prediction.27
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Finally, even if Earman, Roberts, and Smith are correct in saying that
ceteris paribus laws are inadmissible entities for scientific theorizing because
such laws make no predictions and as a result they are untestable, we may still
think that ceteris paribus laws are admissible in ethics. Ethical “laws”—strict
generalizations as well as ceteris paribus generalizations—are not “testable”
in any straightforward way. So if our only reason to object to ceteris paribus
laws in the sciences is that unlike strict laws, ceteris paribus laws are untestable,
then either we must object to all “laws” in ethics, or we may as well allow
ceteris paribus moral laws in our ethical theorizing as well. In other words,
considerations of testability do not differentiate between strict laws and ce-
teris paribus laws in ethics.
It is worth mentioning here one account of ceteris paribus laws due to Peter
Lipton (1999).28 According to Lipton ceteris paribus laws are genuine laws.
However these laws need not identify exceptionless generalizations. Instead
ceteris paribus laws “draw our attention to the stable dispositions and forces
that underlie the flux of behaviour.” (163) For example, “to say that glass
breaks when dropped, ceteris paribus, is to say that glass is fragile and that
this feature is not readily lost.” (163) The crucial point is that ceteris paribus
laws “refer to stable dispositions that may be widely present even if only
rarely directly manifested.” (163–4)
According to Lipton, dispositions can help us to make sense of ceteris
paribus laws because, unlike properties which an object either has or lacks,
dispositions are subject to a tripartite distinction: “displaying, present-but-
not-displaying, or absent.” (163) Roughly, Lipton’s proposal is that ceteris
paribus laws are true if they truly attribute a disposition to a kind. Never-
theless, they can have exceptions because a thing could fail to manifest a
disposition that it has. So, for example, ‘ceteris paribus matches light when
struck’, attributes the disposition to light when struck to individuals of the
kind ‘match’. In an oxygen free environment, for example, a match would
not light when struck even though it has the disposition to light when struck.
So the ceteris paribus law is true, even though there are cases in which the
disposition will not be exemplified. In contrast, ‘ceteris paribus, toothpicks
light when struck’ is false because toothpicks do not have the disposition
to light when struck even if there were some situations in which toothpicks
would light if struck.
The dispositional approach to ceteris paribus laws solves the vacuity
problem for ceteris paribus law-statements and it provides a way to dis-
tinguish between the semantic problem and the predictive problem discussed
above:
We don’t know when all things are equal, but the whole point of the disposi-
tional view is in a sense that we do not need to know, since the disposition is
present regardless. Of course some idea of when all things are equal (or equal
enough) might be essential to applying the law to predict the manifestation of
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the underlying disposition, but the basic dispositional attribution seems safe.
(166)
If, as seems plausible, there are acceptable ways to test attributions of dis-
positions to kinds, then ceteris paribus law-statements may well be admissible
in scientific theorizing.29
Now let’s suppose that there are genuine ceteris paribus laws. Can such
laws explain anything? For example, can we explain the fact that (3) a is
G, by noting that (1) a is F , and that (2) ‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’?
Obviously, we cannot deduce (3) from (1) and (2). However, I have argued
that the deductive model of explanation is unmotivated, and indeed, I have
claimed that once we allow for statistical explanation, we have already given
up on a purely deductive model of explanation anyway. Once we give up on a
purely deductive model of explanation we can see that (deductive) prediction
and explanation may come apart. So although we cannot deductively predict
(3) from (1) and (2), we may still be able to explain (3) in terms of (1) and
(2). One reason why (deductive) prediction and explanation can come apart
is, as Scriven observes, that “we have more data for explaining than we did
for predicting.” (1959b:469)30
To illustrate this point, let us consider one of Hempel’s examples:
If a particular revolution is explained by reference to the growing discontent, on
the part of a large part of the population, with certain prevailing conditions, it is
clear that a general regularity is assumed in this explanation, but we are hardly
in a position to state just what extent and what specific form the discontent has
to assume, and what the environmental conditions have to be, to bring about a
revolution. (1942:41)
Recall that according to Hempel, since we are not in a position to iden-
tify exceptionless generalizations that connect population discontent and the
occurrence of revolutions, an explanation of a particular revolution in those
terms would be, at best, an explanation sketch. And as we have seen in the
previous section, it is not clear how an explanation sketch (for Hempel) is at
all explanatory.
Alternatively, suppose we could find and formulate a ceteris paribus law
relating population discontent and the occurrences of revolutions; perhaps
we could formulate a ceteris paribus law that looked something like this:
(CPR) Ceteris paribus, if a large portion of the population of a particular nation
is discontent with its current regime, then a revolution occurs.31
We cannot use (CPR) to (deductively) predict the occurrence of a revolu-
tion in any particular nation with certainty.32 Even if we knew that 80% of
the population of nation N are discontent with their current regime, we do
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not know whether 80% of the population qualifies as “a large portion,” and,
of course, we do not know whether cetera are paria. So it is impossible to
(deductively) predict with certainty the occurrence of a revolution based on
(CPR) and a set of statements of initial conditions. Nevertheless, suppose we
know that a revolution occurred in nation N, and we now want to explain
this occurrence. If we know that a large portion of the population of nation
N were discontent, then this fact, together with (CPR) is at least a candidate
explanation. And if we cannot find an alternative (plausible) explanation of
the occurrence for the revolution, then we may well accept this candidate
explanation as an adequate explanation of the revolution, even though its
explanans does not logically imply the explanandum.33
V. Explanation without Laws
The claim that there are genuine ceteris paribus laws is highly contentious.
Indeed, according to some theories of laws it is impossible for laws to have
exceptions, and consequently, the notion of a ‘defeasible law’ or a ‘ceteris
paribus law’ is, on these theories, simply an incoherent notion.34 Now if
we were correct in assuming that special sciences like biology, psychology,
economics, and history sometimes provide good explanations even when
strict laws are unavailable, then those who deny that ceteris paribus law
statements refer to genuine laws, must conclude that laws are not required for
explanation—that is, that an explanation can be perfectly adequate without
appealing to any genuine laws at all.35 In this section I will briefly describe
two models of explanation that do not rely on the availability of laws of any
kind.
The first account is due to Michael Scriven (1959b, 1962). Scriven’s in-
sight is that we ought not to confuse an explanation with the justification
of the explanation. Recall that for Hempel, (strict) laws are required for
explanation because an explanation must guarantee the occurrence of the ex-
planandum; if the explanation lacks a true general proposition that connects
the explanans with the explanandum, then the occurrence of the explanans
doesn’t uniquely imply the occurrence of the explanandum. Scriven claims
that Hempel’s insistence on always including laws as part of the explana-
tion is unwarranted—it conflates the explanation itself with our reasons for
thinking that the explanation is a good explanation.
Scriven notes that an explanation could be defective or deficient in (at
least) three different ways: it could be inaccurate, if the explanans is ill sup-
ported by the evidence; inadequate, if the explanans does not fully explain
the explanandum; or irrelevant, if the explanation is of the wrong kind (e.g.,
causal explanation rather than psychological explanation). Corresponding
to these three possible deficiencies, are three types of justifications for ex-
planations: Truth-justifying grounds are the grounds for thinking that the
explanation is accurate—i.e., our evidence for the truth of the explanans;
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Role-justifying grounds are our grounds for thinking that our explanation is
adequate (at least in the relevant context); Type-justifying grounds are our
grounds for thinking that one type of explanation is required rather than
another.
Scriven argues that just as the truth-justifying grounds and the type-
justifying grounds need not be included as a part of an explanation, so do
the role-justifying grounds. If, upon giving an explanation, we are asked why
we think the explanans are true, we will mention the truth justifying grounds
of the explanation—i.e., our evidence for the truth of the explanans—but
these need not be a part of the explanation. Similarly, if, upon giving an
explanation, we are asked why we think the explanans support the explanan-
dum, we will mention the role justifying grounds of the explanation—which
may include a general (strict) law that connects the explanans with the
explanandum—but these, too, need not be a part of the explanation.
Moreover, Scriven contends that the role-justifying grounds need not in-
volve strict laws at all. He illustrates this by presenting a case “where we can
be sure beyond any reasonable doubt that we have a correct explanation”
and yet, we cannot provide strict laws as role-justifiers.
As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the table and thus
turns over the ink-bottle, the contents of which proceed to run over the table’s
edge and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently asked to explain how the
carpet was damaged you have a complete explanation. You did it, by knocking
over the ink. The certainty of this explanation is primeval. It has absolutely
nothing to do with your knowledge of the relevant laws of physics; a cave-man
could supply the same account and be quite as certain of it . . . its certainty
has nothing to do with your ability to quote the laws . . . if you were asked to
produce the role-justifying grounds for your explanation, what could you do?
You could not produce any true universal hypothesis in which the antecedent was
identifiably present (i.e., which avoids such terms as “knock hard enough”), and
the consequent is the effect to be explained . . .The simple fact must be faced
that certain evidence is adequate to guarantee certain explanations without the
benefit of deduction from laws. (456)
Scriven suggests that instead of laws, we should appeal to normic state-
ments as the role-justifying grounds for good explanations of particular
events. Scriven elucidates the notion of a normic statement with a few ex-
amples. (N1) “Rhombi” means the same as “equilateral parallelograms”;36
(N2) The penalty for revoke, in bridge, is two tricks; (N3) Strict Ortho-
dox Jews fast on the Day of Atonement; (N4) Other things being equal a
greater number of troops is an advantage in battle; (N5) A rise in the tariff
characteristically produces a decline in the value of imports. Statements like
(N1)-(N5) are not analytic, and they are also not refutable by a few counter
instances (e.g., a few erring students who use “Rhombi” and “equilateral
parallelograms” in a non-interchangeable way, do not undermine (N1); An
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Orthodox Jew who doesn’t fast due to illness, doesn’t undermine (N3) etc.)
Yet more, these claims are not statistical claims. (N2) could be true even if
most bridge players do not apply a two-trick penalty for revoke; and (N4)
could be true even if in most battles ever fought the armies with the greater
number of troops lost the battle. According to Scriven, “The normic state-
ment says that everything falls into a certain category except those to which
certain special conditions apply. And, although the normic statement itself
does not explicitly list what count as exceptional conditions, it employs a
vocabulary which reminds us of our knowledge of this, our trained judgment
of exceptions.” (1959b:466)
Moral statements like (N6) Lying is wrong making; and (N7) One ought
to bring about the best consequences, could also be understood as normic
statements. The fact that we cannot explicitly list the special conditions under
which lying is not wrong making, for example, need not disqualify (N6) as
the role-justifying grounds for a good explanation of the wrongness of a
particular act of lying. And the fact that trained judgment is required in order
to determine whether the fact that a particular act involves lying explains why
this act is wrong, need not trouble us; since we do not have a satisfactory
analysis of ‘lying’—or any other interesting philosophical concept, for that
matter—then even if (N6) were a strict law, we would still need to apply
trained judgment in order to determine whether a particular act involves
lying in the first place.
Since Scriven contends that the special sciences provide good explanations
even though strict laws are, for the most part, unavailable, he concludes that
normic statements are essential to the explanation of particular occurrences:
Explanation of an individual occurrence must use normic role-justifying grounds
because (1) there aren’t any true universal hypotheses to speak of and (b) sta-
tistical statements are too weak—they abandon the hold on the individual case.
The normic statement tells one what had to happen in this case, unless certain
exceptional circumstances obtained; and the historical judgment is made (and
open to verification) that these circumstances did not obtain. (467)
Another account of non-law-based explanations we should briefly men-
tion is due to William Dray.37 Contra Hempel and Oppenheim, Dray thinks
that an explanation need not (always) demonstrate that the explanandum had
to occur; sometimes an explanation need only to show that the explanandum
could occur. In other words, in some contexts all we need to show is that the
occurrence of the explanandum is possible even though it is not necessary.
To mark this distinction, Dray differentiates between explaining why some-
thing happened, and explaining how it could have happened. “In explaining
why something happened,” he writes, “we rebut the presumption that it need
not have happened, by showing that, in the light of certain considerations
(facts and laws), it had to happen.” (20) In contrast, “in explaining how
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something could have happened, we rebut the presumption that it could not
have happened, by showing that, in the light of certain further facts, there
is after all no good reason for supposing that it could not have happened.”
(20) Dray contends that these two kinds of explanations are distinct because
they provide answers to different questions, and there is no reason to think
that one kind of explanation is more fundamental than the other.
In order to show that something could have happened, we need not find
premises from which its occurrence logically follows. Instead, all we need
to do is to tell a plausible story about how it could have happened. And
according to Dray, historical explanations are often of this kind. So, he
concludes,
an historical explanation may thus amount to telling the story of what actually
happened, and telling it in such a way that the various transitions . . . raise no
eyebrows. The story is told in such a way that presumptions of the form, ‘But
surely that couldn’t have happened!’, are rebutted in advance. Answers to likely
objections are built into the narrative, which may thus have explanatory force
(27)
Dray does not deny that on occasion we may want more than the story
of the event in question. Nevertheless, the telling of any particular story
about what actually happened is meant to answer the question how this
occurrence could have happened. If we ask a different question—e.g., ‘Why
this occurrence and not a different occurrence?’ or, ‘Why this story and
not a different story?’—we should expect a different answer. But this does
not undermine the adequacy of the proposed explanation as an answer to
the question for which it was presented. It is certainly no surprise that
different questions demand different answers, and one ought not to expect
that an explanation offered as an answer to one question would also answer
all possible follow-up questions, since if this were required, no explanation
would have been possible at all.
Following Dray we may distinguish between explaining why an act has a
certain normative status, and explaining how it is possible that an action has
a certain normative status. In explaining why an act has a certain normative
status we “rebut the presumption” – as Dray puts it – that this action need
not have had this normative stats. In contrast, in explaining how it is possible
that an action has a certain normative status we rebut the presumption that
it could not have had this normative status. To paraphrase Dray, a moral
explanation may amount to telling the story of the action in a way that
raises no eyebrows; in a way that presumptions of the form, ‘but surely this
act cannot have this normative status’ are rebutted in advance.
In this section I have presented two accounts of explanation that are not
based on laws, strict or ceteris paribus.38 For our purposes here, we need not
decide whether explanations of particular occurrences ought to be grounded
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in normic statements or whether explanations are (sometimes) “stories of
actions.” The important point for us is that there are alternatives to the
deductive model of explanations. And since the deductive model of expla-
nation is, at best, incomplete, there is no reason to think that explanation
in ethics must conform to the deductive model. Indeed, given the kind of
phenomena that ethics is about, it seems reasonable to expect that the kind
of explanations we will find in ethics would be more similar to explanations
in the special science than to those we find in the physical sciences.
VI. Explanation as a Pragmatic Phenomenon
One of the hallmarks of Hempel’s theory of explanation is that Hempel at-
tempts to provide a syntactical condition for the adequacy of explanations; an
explanation is adequate only if the explanandum syntactically follows from
the explanans. However, several philosophers, and most notably Scriven,
have argued that “Explanation is not a syntactical but a pragmatic notion,”
(1959b:452) and consequently, any syntactical constraints are bound to be
too restrictive. According to Scriven, the only thing we can say about ex-
planation without artificially limiting the concept is that “explanations must
produce understanding, and not simply knowledge.” (451) Scriven insists
that tying explanation to understanding in this way does not imply that the
standards for the adequacy of explanations are purely subjective, because
“there are objective tests for understanding just as for knowing or inferring.
They happen not to be syntactical tests as are (supposedly) those for deduc-
ing.” (452) Unfortunately, though, Scriven doesn’t have a lot to say about
the notion of understanding.
Hempel, in his 1965 ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’, admits that there
is a pragmatic sense of ‘explanation’: “To explain something to a person is
to make it plain and intelligible to him, to make him understand it.” (425)
However, in this pragmatic sense, the very same account could constitute an
explanation for one person and not for another. So this pragmatic sense of
explanation affords a relativised notion of explanation: E is an explanation
for a particular individual; there are no explanations simpliciter. Hempel
acknowledges that the pragmatic aspects of explanation are interesting and
important. Nevertheless, he contends that we must try to find an objective
account of scientific explanation, which conforms to the objective (i.e., non
agent relative) standards of scientific research. The covering law model of
explanation is meant to satisfy this demand for objectivity. Moreover, in
response to Scriven’s critique of his deductive model, Hempel declares:
To call attention to the important pragmatic facets of explanation and to in-
dicate the diverse procedures that may be appropriate in different cases to dis-
pel the perplexity reflected in someone’s quest for an explanation is not to
show that a nonpragmatic model of scientific explanation must be hopelessly
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inadequate . . . It is therefore beside the point to complain that the covering-
law models do not closely match the form in which working scientists actually
present their explanations. (427–8)
Hempel is clearly correct in saying that merely calling attention to prag-
matic facets of explanation does not show that all nonpragmatic models
of explanation must be inadequate. But this response seems to misconstrue
Scriven’s objection. Scriven doesn’t merely point out that the covering law
model is not exemplified in scientific discourse—which, as Hempel observes,
would have been besides the point—but rather, Scriven claims that many
perfectly adequate explanations cannot be restated as deductive arguments in
which the (sentence describing the) explanandum follows from the (sentences
describing the) explanans. So Hempel’s response to Scriven is misguided.
Moreover, Hempel seems to conflate explanation as a pragmatic notion
with explanation as a subjective notion. To say that explanation is a prag-
matic notion is to say that what qualifies as an adequate explanation is
context sensitive, but it need not be agent relative in any objectionable way.
And as Salmon (1989) observes, developments in the study of formal prag-
matics in the 70’s made possible the development of a pragmatic theory
of explanation. So one final approach to explanation we ought to consider
here is a theory of explanation that takes seriously the pragmatic nature of
explanation, and Bas van Fraassen (1980) developed such a theory.
Van Fraassen summarizes his view as follows:
[An explanation is] a three-term relation, between theory, fact, and context. No
wonder that no single relation between theory and fact ever managed to fit
more than a few examples! Being an explanation is essentially relative, for an
explanation is an answer . . . Since an explanation is an answer, it is evaluated
vis-a`-vis a question, which is a request for information. But exactly what is
requested by means of the question ‘Why is it the case that P?,’ differs from
context to context. (156)
An explanation, according to van Fraassen is an answer to a why-
question.39 Van Fraassen identifies why-questions with an ordered triple
<Pk,X,R>, where Pk is the topic of the question (or the explanandum), X
is the contrast class, and R is the relevance relation. It is important to realize
that the same interrogative sentence can express different questions on dif-
ference occasions in which it is uttered. For example, consider the question:
“Why is act A morally wrong?” This sentence may express (at least) two
different questions: (1) “Why is act A (rather than act B) morally wrong?” or
(2) “Why is act A morally wrong (rather than morally right)?” The topic of
the question in both cases is the same—i.e., that act A is morally wrong—but
the relevant contrast class is different: in the former question the contrast
class includes: (P1) ‘Act A is morally wrong’; (P2) ‘Act B is morally wrong’;
Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation 23
etc.; whereas the contrast class of the latter question includes: (P1) ‘Act A is
morally wrong’; (P2) ‘Act A is morally right’.
A direct answer to a why-question will take the form: Pk in contrast to
the rest of X because A, where A is a proposition that bears relation R to
the couple <Pk, X>. And an explanation, according to van Fraassen, is a
direct answer to a why-question. We evaluate explanations in (at least) three
ways: (i) how likely is this explanation to be true (given our background
knowledge); (ii) to what extent does the explanation favor Pk, rather than
other members of the contrast class; (iii) how this explanation compares with
other possible explanations.
For example, suppose we want to explain why act A is morally wrong
(rather than morally right). The topic, or the explanandum, is that act A
is wrong. The contrast class is {A is morally wrong, A is morally right}. A
possible answer to the question is that A is wrong (rather than right) because
A involves the breaking of a promise. The quality of this explanation depends
on considerations like the following: Does A in fact involve the breaking of
a promise? To what extent does the fact that A involves the breaking of a
promise support the claim that A is wrong rather than right? How does this
explanation compare to other possible explanations (e.g., “A is wrong (rather
than right) because A involves hurting an innocent by stander”) etc.
Note that an adequate explanation, on this model, need not include laws
at all. Furthermore, an explanation need not show that the explanandum had
to occur; instead, it only has to show that the explanandum is more likely
than the contextually salient alternatives in the contrast class, given (the
contextually salient features of) our background knowledge. So, for example,
the fact that a particular action involves the breaking of a promise might be
a perfectly good explanation of its wrongness on one occasion, even though
on a different occasion the fact that an action involves the breaking of a
promise may be irrelevant to the explanation of its wrongness.
VII. Explanation in Ethics
In the previous sections I have shown that we have good reasons to think
that adequate explanations need not appeal to exceptionless principles. I have
argued that the most influential account of explanation according to which
exceptionless generalizations are essential to proper explanation simply as-
serts this claim but does not argue for it. Moreover, since the special sciences
sometimes provide adequate explanations even when exceptionless general-
ization are not available, then even if the deductive model were a successful
account of explanation in the physical sciences, we would have to identify
another non-deductive model of explanation to account for explanation in
other areas. Finally, I have shown that other accounts of explanation are
readily available. In particular I’ve discussed explanations that are based on
the availability of ceteris paribus laws, and explanations that do not require
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laws at all. I conclude that a survey of the literature on scientific explanation
not only does not vindicate the generalist presumption that explanation must
appeal to exceptionless principles, but rather it shows that this presumption
is widely regarded as untenable. Indeed, this survey of the literature on expla-
nation demonstrates that we are used to, and comfortable with, explanations
that are not grounded in exceptionless generalizations in (almost) all areas
of inquiry.
My discussion in the previous sections focused on accounts of scientific
explanation, and clearly there are many differences between empirical sci-
ences and ethics. So in order to employ any one of the models of explanation
I presented in the previous sections in ethics, some modifications will be
needed. Nevertheless, it is not hard to see how such changes can be made.
Explanations based on ceteris paribus laws, or explanations grounded in
normic sentences, for instance, as well as explanations relative to an implicit
contrast class, could quite effortlessly be “transferred” to ethics.
Elsewhere, I distinguished between two types of generalist approaches:
principle monism and principle pluralism.40 Monists are those who claim
that there is only one intrinsically morally relevant property—call it P—and
that every action that exemplifies P is morally right. Pluralists hold that
there are several intrinsically morally relevant properties—call these prop-
erties P1 . . .Pn—and that for each intrinsically morally relevant property,
Pi, there will be a presumptive, or pro tanto, principle: for any action, A, if
A exemplifies Pi then A is presumptively morally right (or wrong). I have
argued that both monists and pluralists are generalists because they both
believe that an explanation of the rightness of an action is inadequate unless
it is grounded in an exceptionless moral principle—strict or pro tanto.
We can now see that only monism is compatible with a deductive model
of explanation. For monists the explanation of the rightness of A is that A
exemplifies P, and that every action that exemplifies P is morally right; the
explanandum logically follows form the explanans. For pluralists, in contrast,
an explanation of the rightness of A is not deductive, because even if A
exemplifies Pi, and every action that exemplifies Pi is presumptively morally
right, it does not follow that A is morally right (in this case), but only that
A is presumptively morally right. Ross (1930), for example, was well aware of
this difficulty. “Our judgements about our particular duties,” he explains,
are not logical conclusions from self-evident premises. The only possible
premises would be the general principles stating their prima facie rightness or
wrongness qua having the different characteristics they do have; and even if we
could (as we cannot) apprehend the extent to which an act will tend on the
one hand, for example, to bring about advantages for our benefactors, and on
the other hand to bring about disadvantages for fellow men who are not our
benefactors, there is no principle by which we can draw the conclusion that it
is on the whole right or on the whole wrong. In this respect the judgement as
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to the rightness of a particular act is just like the judgement as to the beauty
of a particular natural object or work of art. A poem is, for instance, in respect
of certain qualities beautiful and in respect of certain others not beautiful; and
our judgement as to the degree of beauty it possesses on the whole is never
reached by logical reasoning from the apprehension of its particular beauties
or particular defects. Both in this and in the moral case we have more or less
probable opinions which are not logically justified conclusions from the general
principles that are recognized as self-evident. (31)
Pluralists, like particularists, must endorse a non-deductive model of ex-
planation. But once we have given up on a deductive model of explanation,
it is not clear what extra explanatory value is gained from the commitment
to the claim that every action that exemplifies Pi is presumptively morally
wrong, as opposed to the claim that Pi is typically wrong-making.
Ross believed that the fact that a fulfillment of a promise is always right-
making, for instance, is self evident.
What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima facie right-
ness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection
to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty. (33)
For Ross, then, the commitment to the existence of exceptionless presump-
tive principles is not based on their role in explaining moral phenomena, but
rather it is due simply to their self-evidence. However, it is not clear why
Ross thinks that these principles are self-evident. Presumably, Ross thinks
that we observe a few actions that involve promise keeping, and we notice
that in those cases promise keeping is right-making. By reflecting on these
cases we can see, according to Ross, that promise keeping is always morally
relevant. But it is not clear how one could conclude from a particular case, or
a set of cases, that promise keeping is always morally relevant. For example,
suppose that Jack promises Jill that he would plagiarize his final paper for
his philosophy course. Now suppose that he does. It sounds comical (to my
ear) to say that although his act of plagiarizing is wrong, it has at least one
thing going for it—it is a keeping of a promise. I don’t deny that one could
insist that this is so, but it certainly doesn’t seem self evident that in keeping
his promise to plagiarize, Jack’s plagiarism is made any better.41 And once
we give up on a deductive model of explanation—as pluralists must—the
commitment to the claim that promise keeping is always morally relevant is
not only unmotivated but also unnecessary.
Elsewhere I argued that particularist and pluralist theories have a cer-
tain advantage over monist theories; particularist and pluralist theories, I
claimed, can better explain the availability of good moral advice than monist
theories.42 If I am right about this—that is, if we have reason to prefer
particularism and pluralism to monism—then we now see that we also have
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reason to prefer particularism to pluralism, since pluralists’ commitment to
the availability of strict presumptive principles has theoretical costs, but it
doesn’t seem to have any theoretical benefits.
VIII. Conclusion
The claim that moral explanation must appeal to exceptionless principles has
rarely been argued for.43 Nevertheless, many philosophers find the particu-
larist research program objectionable because they believe that giving up on
the search for exceptionless moral principles is tantamount to giving up on
moral theorizing. I hope to have shown that this belief is mere dogma—it
is based on an undefended, and indeed, an indefensible notion of explana-
tion. A careful study of the literature on explanation reveals that a deductive
approach to explanation is unmotivated, and moreover, that it is widely re-
garded as an inadequate account of explanation in the special sciences, and
arguably in the physical sciences as well.
I have not recommended any particular non-deductive model of expla-
nation. I believe that any one of the non-deductive models discussed in
sections III-VI is compatible with particularism—once the proper adjust-
ments are made to accommodate moral explanation rather than scientific
explanation. Indeed, different particularist theories may endorse and defend
different models of explanation, and the structure of each individual partic-
ularist theory may well depend on the specific details of the non-deductive
theory of explanation it is committed to. Some particularist theories may try
to identify ceteris paribus moral generalizations or moral normic sentences,
other theories may look for moral dispositions, and yet others may focus on
the pragmatic nature of moral explanations.
Each of the theories of explanation discussed in this paper is not without
difficulties. Explanation, like all other philosophically interesting concepts, is
a difficult concept to analyze, and the plurality of theories of explanation may
lead us to conclude with Roth, that “there is no good reason to believe that
there is just one correct explication of the notion of explanation.” (1988:3)
Be that as it may, the plurality of theories of explanation, the difficulties
they all face, and the fact that there is no consensus about which theory
of explanation is correct, should convince us that one cannot dismiss a
competing moral theory simply by pointing out that there are difficulties for
the account of explanation this theory is committed to.
One might still insist that since there are known difficulties for all the
accounts of explanation currently available, then we have reason to look for
exceptionless moral principles. One might argue that such principles, if found,
would provide a simpler explanation of moral phenomena than any one of
the alternatives discussed above. But first, the simplicity of the explanation
will depend, of course, on whether the exceptionless principles involved are
actually simple. If the only exceptionless principles we find are extremely
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complex, then an explanation in which they are employed may well be no
simpler than its competitors.
Second, even though simplicity may count in favor of a theory, it is not
the only virtue a theory must exemplify. In our efforts to eliminate counterex-
amples, we may inadvertently rob our principles of their explanatory power,
for example, by restricting the range of situations to which they apply, or as
a result of ad hoc modifications to circumvent exceptions.
Finally, we must not forget that moral phenomena are undeniably com-
plex, and as Hayek (1967) observes “a simple theory of phenomena which are
in their nature complex . . . is probably merely of necessity false—at least with-
out a specified ceteris paribus assumption, after the full statement of which
the theory would no longer be simple.” (28) Einstein is remarked upon as
saying that everything should be as simple as possible but no simpler. And
this is as true in ethics as it is in the sciences.44
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1 Or at least, all principles that have been proposed thus far are contentious.
2 See Leibowitz (2009a).
3 Probably the most elaborate non-deductive model of moral explanation is due to Lance
& Little (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). But see also Dancy (1993, 2004), Little (2000), Va¨yrynen
(2006, 2009), and McKeever & Ridge (2006).
4 Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). For a discussion of the importance and influence of
Hempel and Oppenheim’s essay, see, for example, Salmon (1989) and Woodward (2003a, 2003b).
5 See Ladd (1952) fn. 1.
6 P. 499. Ladd borrows the phrase “potential predictive force” from Hempel and Oppen-
heim. See Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) p. 138.
7 One of the “statements of general laws” that Hempel and Oppenheim claim their proposed
explanation appeals to is “a statement about the small thermic conductivity of glass.” Their
explanation does mention that the “coefficient of expansion [of mercury] is considerably larger
than that of glass,” but as stated, this is a statement of fact and not a statement of a general
law.
8 The second example Hempel and Oppenheim present is no more helpful than the first:
To an observer in a row boat, that part of an oar which is under water appears to be
bent upwards. The phenomenon is explained by means of general laws—mainly the law of
refraction and the law that water is an optically denser medium than air-and by reference
to certain antecedent conditions—especially the facts that part of the oar is in the water,
part in the air, and that the oar is practically a straight piece of wood.—Thus, here again,
the question “Why does the phenomenon happen?” is construed as meaning “according
to what general laws, and by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon
occur?” (136)
In this case Hempel and Oppenheim do not present the explanation of the phenomenon in ques-
tion. Instead they simply assert “the phenomenon is explained by means of general laws . . . and
by reference to certain antecedent conditions.” Again, the “thus” in the final sentence is
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misleading. Surely Hempel and Oppenheim construed the question “Why does the phenomenon
happen?” as meaning “according to what general laws, and by virtue of what antecedent con-
ditions does the phenomenon occur?” but they offered no argument as to why it should be so
construed. Moreover, their use of passive voice here is also ambiguous. The phrase “the question
is construed as” could be read as a descriptive claim—emphasizing the point that Hempel and
Oppenheim in fact construed it in this way—or as a normative claim—the question ought to be
construed as they propose. In either case we have no argument for the claim that the question
should be construed as Hempel and Oppenheim construe it.
9 For example, lying is not wrong (or even wrong-making) when playing a game in which
lying is the point of the game (e.g., Diplomacy or Contraband). Other examples of lies that
are, arguably, not wrong (or wrong-making): lying to a Nazi concentration camp guard; lying
to a dying patient (e.g., “everything is going to be all right”); Lying to a person about their
appearance (e.g., just before going on stage to give an important lecture, your spouse asks you
how she looks; it is probably not wrong to tell her that she looks great even if she, in fact,
doesn’t—i.e., even if she looks nervous or pale).
10 For example, the “organ harvest” scenario: it is wrong to kill an innocent passer-by
(without her consent) in order to harvest her organs and to transplant them into five other
patients who would otherwise die.
11 For a similar criticism of Hempel and Oppenheim see Scriven (1962).
12 See Scriven (1962)—esp. section 4.2—for a critique of Hempel and Oppenheim’s notion
of “complete explanation.”
13 See, for example, Dray (1954, 1957) and Scriven (1959a, 1959b, 1962).
14 For a discussion of these issues see, for example, Salmon (1989).
15 There are now well known counterexamples to Hempel and Oppenheim’s account, which
I do not discuss here. For a list of these counterexamples see, for example, Salmon (1989) and
Woodward (2003b).
16 This is not a sufficient condition for lawhood, but only a necessary condition. We need to
distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations that can be expressed as true universal
conditionals.
17 For more on this debate see, for example, Cartwright (1983. 1989), Pietroski and Rey
(1995), and Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002).
18 See, for example, Earman and Roberts (1999).
19 See, for example, Fodor (1991), Pietroski and Rey (1995), Woodward (2002), and Earman,
Roberts, and Smith (2002).
20 For a recent defense of the view that laws can have exceptions see Schrenk (2007).
21 See, for example, Schiffer (1991), Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002), and Woodward
(2002).
22 See Pietroski and Rey (1995). For somewhat similar proposals see Fodor (1991), and
Silverberg (1996). For a different account of the semantics of ceteris paribus generalizations see
Lange (2000, 2002).
23 See, for example, Woodward (2002) and Eearman, Roberts, and Smith (2002). Earman,
Roberts, and Smith write: “Many substances that are safe for human consumption are white;
for every substance that is white and is not safe for human consumption, there presumably
exists some explanation of its dangerousness (e.g., in terms of its chemical structure and the
way it interacts with the human nervous system); these explanations are not ad hoc, but can
be supported by a variety of kinds of evidence; but none of this constitutes evidence for the
hypothesis that it is a law that CP, white substances are safe for human consumption.” (294)
Similarly, Woodward claims that Fodor’s account and Pietroski and Rey’s account are “far too
permissive. On both proposals, the generalization “All charged objects accelerate at 10 m/s∧2 ”
qualifies a ceteris paribus law.” (310).
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24 Schurz (2001) criticizes Pietroski and Rey’s account and he proposes an alternative
account of ceteris paribus laws. Nevertheless, he admits that on Pietroski and Rey’s account
ceteris paribus laws are not vacuous, but only almost vacuous.
25 Silverberg (1996) observes that the consequences of denying that ceteris paribus clauses
are meaningful are unacceptable: “ceteris paribus conditions are unexceptional instances of a
very common, and needed, phenomenon in our concepts and assertions, and hence [the] claim
that cp conditions are semantically objectionable is a suggestion of unacceptably destructive
import.” (211) This is because most conditionals we assert are defeasible.
26 Lange (2002) contends that judgment is required in the application of strict laws in specific
cases in much the same way that it is required for the application of ceteris paribus laws. Even if
it were possible to replace the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause with a fully explicit list of conditions, the
application of the “fully explicit” law “derives its content . . . by virtue of our implicit background
understanding of what would count as compelling reasons for (or against) the correctness of
applying it to a given case.” (409) Once we realize this, we see that there is no special problem
regarding truth conditions for, or predictions with, ceteris paribus statements. As Lange explains,
the content of the “law of definite proportion” stated as a ceteris paribus law—i.e., Any chemical
compound consists of elements in unvarying proportions by mass, ceteris paribus—is no more
vague than a statement of this law without a ceteris paribus quantifier (if such a statement
were possible)—e.g., Any chemical compound consists of elements in unvarying proportions by
mass unless the compound is a network solid or a polymer. The content of ‘network solid’ in
the second formulation is no less vague than the content of the ceteris paribus clause in the
first. This, according to Lange, shows that “law need not be associated straightforwardly with
a regularity. It may be associated only with an inference rule that is ‘reliable’ – i.e., that leads to
conclusions close enough to the truth for the intended purposes.” (411).
27 I am grateful to Gary Matthews for calling my attention to this fact.
28 This is not the only available account of ceteris paribus laws. One alternative account,
due to Marc Lange, is based on a pragmatist account of lawhood. Lange argues that in order
to see that ceteris paribus generalization are genuine laws, we should identify the distinctive
role laws play in scientific theorizing, and recognize that ceteris paribus generalizations play the
same role. See Lange (2000, 2003). For an application of this model to explanation in ethics
see Lance and Little (2007). Silverberg (1996) makes a similar point regarding ceteris paribus
generalizations: “Ceteris paribus laws are laws which, if the qualifying condition expressed in
their ceteris paribus clauses were removed, could have counterexamples, and hence would require
the qualification of their universality that ceteris paribus clauses express. Despite this need for
qualification, the qualified principles are laws, since they retain considerable generality or scope,
and possess considerable predictive and/or explanatory value.” (201).
29 For more on dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, rather than laws are the fun-
damental units of explanation—see Cartwright (1989, 1983) and Mumford (1998). For an
application of this view to ethics see Robinson (2006) (Note, however, that my understanding
of the disagreement between particularists and generalists is very different from Robinson’s).
30 See Scriven (1959a) for an argument that shows that explanation and prediction can
come apart based on a discussion of the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. See also
MacIntyre (1981) Ch. 8.
31 I do not contend that (CPR) is a genuine ceteris paribus law—indeed, as stated, it
probably isn’t. I only use (CPR) for illustrative purposes and for the sake of the example I will
assume that it is a genuine ceteris paribus law.
32 As noted above, we may predict that a revolution will occur in nation N, and we may
justify our prediction by appealing to (CPR) without using (CPR) to deduce that a revolution
will occur.
33 This is a simplified version of a kind of explanation that Scriven (1959b) calls ‘selection
explanations’. “What we have is a range of formally possible explanations . . . and on the basis
of the facts of the case, we select one of the antecedents as the explanation. It is the particular
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fact, not the general proposition or the derivation, which provides the explanation in such
cases . . .The point of the explanation is to locate the relevant causal antecedent, not to prove
that it is a possible one.” (462).
34 For example, Armstrong’s view, according to which laws are grounded in identities be-
tween universals, seems to preclude the possibility of laws that have exceptions. See Lance and
Little (2007).
35 Schiffer (1991) writes: “When I read biology, I have a hard time finding anything that
looks like a law-invoking explanation, and I think I know why. Suppose you just invented the
spring-activated mousetrap and had to explain how it worked. You would explain that, when
the device works, it’s because the mouse nibbles at cheese placed on a release mechanism;
the movement caused by the nibbling releases a bar attached to a stretched spring; etc. But
you wouldn’t mention any laws. Maybe if you went on in an explanatory chain long enough,
you’d get to laws: but they’d be laws of physics, not laws of mousetrap theory. In the same
way, much of biology is concerned to explain how various mechanisms work—think of the
explanation of photosynthesis—and such explanations seem not to invoke any biological laws,
strict or ceteris paribus . . . since [cognitive psychology, too, is concerned with] explaining how
mechanisms work, there’s no obvious reason such explanations should need laws, strict or ceteris
paribus.” (16) Schiffer does not explicitly say whether he thinks that “complete” explanations
in biology and cognitive psychology must mention the physical laws that ground the operation
of the mechanisms they explain. His last remark, however—that there is no obvious reason
such explanation should need laws—suggests that he believes that explanations are perfectly
adequate without mention of any laws.
36 Scriven explains that unlike the sentence “Rhombi are equilateral parallelograms,” (N1)
is not analytic because its denial is not self-contradictory.
37 See Dray (1954, 1957). The citations in the text are from Dray (1954).
38 The two non-law-based theories of explanation discussed in this section can easily be
employed in order to explain moral phenomena. These two theories, however, are not the
only non-law-based theories of explanation that have been proposed. Woodward (2002, 2003a),
for example, developed a non-law-based theory of explanation according to which to explain
something is to cite a feature that makes a difference to the occurrence of the explanandum. It
is crucial for Woodward’s account that we can identify that a feature is (causally) relevant to
the occurrence of the explanandum without identifying the specific conditions under which it
makes a difference. The way we do this, according to Woodward, is through randomized tests
where we can justifiably assume that other relevant (or interfering) factors are (roughly) equally
distributed between the test group and the control group. But randomized tests are not standard
practice in moral theorizing, so some modifications, or at least clarifications, are in order if we
are to adopt this model of explanation as an account of explanation in ethics.
39 Van Fraassen, following Hempel and Oppenheim, identifies explanation as an answer to
a why-question. But as Dray (1954, 1957, 1959), Scriven (1959b, 1962), and Salmon (1989) point
out, not all answers to why-questions are explanations, and not all explanations are answers to
why-questions. Yet although the details of van Fraassen’s account are not quite right, his main
insight—that whether a particular account qualifies an adequate explanation depends on the
context in which the explanation is given—is still worth noting. For a critique of van Fraassen’s
account, see Kitcher and Salmon (1987) and Salmon (1989).
40 See Leibowitz (2009b).
41 For additional critiques of Ross’s self-evidence claim and the epistemological difficulties
involved, see Dancy (1983).
42 See my (2009b).
43 Ladd (1952) is a notable exception.
44 In his paper ‘The Tyranny of Principles’ Stephen Toulmin reports on a quotation, at-
tributed to H. L. Mencken, that hangs in the staff lounge at The Hastings Center: “For Every
human problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.” (1981:31).
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